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Grover’s operator in the two-qubit case can transform a basis into its conjugated basis. A permu-
tation operator can transform a state in the two conjugated bases into its orthogonal state. These
properties are included in a threshold quantum protocol. The proposed threshold quantum proto-
col is secure based the proof that the legitimate participators can only eavesdrop 2 bits of 3 bits
operation information on one two-qubit with error probability 3/8. We propose a scheme to detect
the Trojan horse attack without destroying the legal qubit.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
In a secure multi-party computation [1, 2], n partici-
pants, P1, P2, ...Pn, compute and reveal the result of the
multi-variable function f(x1, x2, ...xn), where xi is a se-
cret input provided by Pi. It is also necessary to preserve
the maximum privacy of each input xi. The menace of in-
put leakage comes from eavesdroppers and the dishonest
participants. In contrast to the eavesdroppers outside,
the dishonest participants have many advantages to at-
tack another’s input. As pointed out in Ref.[3], if multi-
party scheme is secure for the dishonest participants, it
is secure for any eavesdropper.
Based on the operators I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, U =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
,
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and H = 1√
2
( −1 1
1 1
)
, quantum se-
cure direct communication (QSDC) protocols [4, 5, 6],
multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocols
[7, 8, 9] and threshold quantum protocol [10] have been
proposed. Lucamarini and Mancini [6] showed that the
QSDC protocols [4, 5, 6] are quasisecure to eavesdropper.
Deng et al.[8] showed a Trojan horse attack scheme
against MQSS protocol proposed by Ref.[7]. A dishon-
est participant prepares a multi-photon instead of a legal
single-photon and sends it to another participant. Then
he measures the photons with some photon number split-
ter (PNS) and detectors. The attack introduces no error
into the communication.
Qin et al.[9] showed another attack scheme against
MQSS protocol proposed by Ref.[7]. A dishonest par-
ticipant prepares the fake state (|01〉12 − |10〉12)/
√
2
and then sends the first qubit to another participant.
After receiving the first qubit operated, the dishon-
est participant can know another participant’s opera-
tion I, U,H or H by measuring qubits 1, 2 in the basis
{(|01〉 − |10〉)/√2, (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2, (|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉 −
|11〉)/2, (|00〉 + |01〉 + |10〉 − |11〉)/2}. The attack also
introduces no error into the communication.
Participants can pick out a subset of the photons as the
sample for eavesdropping check. Deng et al.[8] proposed
that participants split each signal of the sample with a
PNS and measure the two signals. Qin et al.[9] proposed
that participants replace the sample photons with decoy
photons.
In a threshold quantum cryptography, assumption that
all the participants are honest is infeasible. The t-out-
of-n quantum cash threshold protocol proposed by Toku-
naga et al.[10] is not secure. With the help of the attack
schemes proposed in Ref.[8, 9], the first participant P1,
called a center in Ref.[10], can completely eavesdrop t−1
secret inputs kept by t− 1 other participants in a issuing
phase one by one, and then reconstructs the copies of
quantum cash that can pass the checking phase.
The sample photons schemes [8, 9] can improve the se-
curity of the threshold quantum protocol [10]. However
the number of qubits of the generated quantum state by
the threshold protocol must exceed that of the quantum
state generated by the original (nonthreshold) protocol.
We do not follow this line of argument. Instead we mod-
ify the protocol in the two-qubit quantum operation.
A quantum computation consists of three constituents:
generating quantum states, performing unitary opera-
tions and measuring quantum states. The dishonest par-
ticipants whose number is less than threshold number
can generate the fake quantum states or perform the fake
unitary operations to attack one other’s input, but before
measurement, they must reconstruct the legal quantum
state to avoid the detection. In this paper, a honest mea-
surer is assumed .
In this paper, instead of one-qubit operators, we show
that two-qubit operators based on Grovers algorithm
[11, 12] can adapt to threshold quantum cryptography
protocol. Each participant does one of eight kinds of
operations on every two-qubit as input. The dishon-
est participants can eavesdrop 2 bits of 3 bits opera-
tion information on one two-qubit at most with whether
fake signal or legal signal. The dishonest participants
have to introduce 38 error probability into one two-qubit
when they eavesdrop maximum information quantity 2
2bits. These properties guarantee the proposed threshold
quantum protocol against an attack with a fake signal.
Moreover, since even the three-qubit Grover’s algorithm
has been experimentally realized [13], threshold quantum
cryptography protocol based on Grover’s algorithm be-
comes highly practical for experimental realization.
In this paper, we propose a detection scheme to dis-
tinguish one single-qubit from one multi-qubit without
destroying the legal qubit. The scheme can detect one
multi-qubit instead of one single-qubit with probability
1
2 . So a Trojan horse attack [8, 14] can be resisted.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II intro-
duces two-qubit operators based on Grovers algorithm
[11]. Section III proposes an t-out-of-n quantum cash
threshold protocol followed the line sketched in [10] but
with some relevant differences. Section IV then shows
security of the threshold protocol. Section V proofs that
Trojan horse attack can be detected. Section VI then
draws some conclusions.
II. TWO-QUBIT OPERATIONS BASED ON
GROVER’S ALGORITHM
Grover’s operator [11] in the two-qubit case
V =
1
2


−1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 1
1 1 1 −1

 (1)
can transform the basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉 and |11〉} to the
basis {|00〉 = 1/2(−|00〉 + |01〉 + |10〉 + |11〉), |01〉 =
1/2(|00〉 − |01〉 + |10〉 + |11〉), |10〉 = 1/2(|00〉 + |01〉 −
|10〉+ |11〉) and |11〉 = 1/2(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)}.
A permutation operator
U =


0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0

 (2)
has properties: U |00〉 = |01〉, U |01〉 = |10〉, U |10〉 = |11〉,
U |11〉 = |00〉, U |00〉 = |01〉, U |01〉 = |10〉, U |10〉 = |11〉,
and U |11〉 = |00〉. V and U are commute operators.
In the threshold quantum proposed below, a center
does one of eight kinds unitary operation on two-qubit:
U(00)V (0) = I,
U(01)V (0) = U,
U(10)V (0) = U · U,
U(11)V (0) = U · U · U,
U(00)V (1) = V,
U(01)V (1) = U · V,
U(10)V (1) = U · U · V,
U(11)V (1) = U · U · U · V,
where I is identity operator.
III. T-OUT-N THRESHOLD SCHEME
We propose the t-out-of-n threshold version of quan-
tum cash protocol. There are three differences between
our protocol and the protocol proposed by Tokunaga et
al.[10] mainly: one is the assumption of dishonest par-
ticipants instead of that of honest participants, one is
two-qubit operation instead of one-qubit operation to re-
sist the attack proposed by [9], the other is an additional
detection to resist the Trojan horse attack [8, 14]. Fol-
lowing the line sketched in [10], We describe the scheme
in detail.
Distribution phase. In this phase, a dealer distributes
shared secrets to centers.
(i) A dealer chooses an original secret
K = (a1, b1, a2, b2, ..., am, bm) (3)
for each banknote with Lk, where Lk is a kind of serial
number (used as a label for K) and ai, bi are uniformly
chosen, ai ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, bi ∈ {0, 1}
(ii) The dealer then makes n shares, S1, ..., Sn, of K
using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [15] over F2N as
follows, where N = 3m. The dealer chooses xj ’s for
j = 1, ..., n which are n distinct, nonzero elements in
F2N , and the xj ’s are published with LK . The dealer
randomly chooses a secret (t − 1)th-degree polynomial
f(x) over F2N , where f(0) = K (here, K is a polynomial
representation of K). Then, the dealer computes Sj =
f(xj) for j=1,...,n over F2N .
(iii) The dealer secretly sends Sj with LK to center Pj
for each j = 1, ..., n.
Precomputation phase. In this phase, the centers com-
pute the preliminary information for the following col-
laborative procedure. The preliminary information de-
pends on which subset of centers is chosen to collaborate.
Here, for simplicity of description, we assume that t cen-
ters, P1, ..., Pt, collaborate to issue quantum banknotes
or check their validity. Note that the set of collaborative
centers can be different in each issuing or checking phase.
(i) For each j = 1, ..., t, Pj calculates and secretly
stores the following value (given by the Lagrange inter-
polation formula):
Kj = Sj
∏
1≤l≤t,l 6=j
xl
xl − xj (4)
over F2N . Let
K [j] = (a
[j]
1 , b
[j]
1 , a
[j]
2 , b
[j]
2 , ..., a
[j]
m , b
[j]
m ) (5)
be the binary representation of Kj in F2N , where a
[j]
i ∈
{00, 01, 10, 11}, b[j]i ∈ {0, 1}. Although each secret value
Sj (and Kj) is kept in each center Pj locally, these values
satisfy the following equations globally:
K =
t∑
j=1
Kj (6)
3overF2N . In binary representation, Eq.(6) can be written
as
K = ⊕tj=1K [j] (7)
where ⊕ represents bitwise exclusive-OR. Note that even
in the following collaboration procedure,Kj(K
[j]) is kept
secret at Pj and the original secret K(K
[j]) is not recov-
ered.
Issuing phase. In this phase, t centers collaborate to
issue a banknote (LK , |φ〉). Here, we assume the t centers
are P1, ..., Pt. Hereafter, we will describe a sequential
protocol from P1 to Pt, but the order is not essential,
any order is possible.
(i) P1 generates a quantum state
|φ[1]〉 = |ψ
a
[1]
1 ,b
[1]
1
〉 ⊗ |ψ
a
[1]
2 ,b
[1]
2
〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ψ
a
[1]
m ,b
[1]
m
〉, (8)
where |ψ
a
[1]
i
,b
[1]
i
〉 is defined as follow:
|φ00,0〉 = |00〉, |φ01,0〉 = |01〉,
|φ10,0〉 = |10〉, |φ11,0〉 = |11〉,
|φ00,1〉 = |00〉, |φ01,1〉 = |01〉,
|φ10,1〉 = |10〉, |φ11,1〉 = |11〉. (9)
The value of bi determines the kind of the basis. If bi is 0
then ai is encoded in the basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}; if bi
is 1 then ai is encoded in the basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}.
The (LK , |φ[1]〉) is sent to P2.
(ii) For each j = 2, . . . , t, when Pj receives
(LK , |φ[j−1]〉) from Pj−1, he detects the Trojan horse at-
tack and acts his secret input on |φ[j−1]〉.
Our detection scheme is depicted in Fig. 1. To each
qubit |d〉 of |φ[j−1]〉, called data qubit, Pj uniformly
choices auxiliary qubit |a〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉}, acts Hadamard
gate on |a〉, performs one CNOT gates on the auxiliary
qubit and the data qubit (the former is the controller and
the latter is the target), performs the unitary transfor-
mation
T =
1√
2


1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 −1
0 1 −1 0

 (10)
on the auxiliary qubit and the data qubit, and measures
the auxiliary qubit in basis {|0〉, |1〉}. To legal single
qubit |d〉, Tad · CNOTad · (Ha ⊗ Id) = Ia ⊗ Id, so the
auxiliary qubit keeps. In Section V, we proof that the
detection scheme can detect a multi-qubit instead of a
single-qubit with probability 12 . If the auxiliary qubit
flips, a single-qubit must be replaced by a multi-qubit,
so Pj rejects the banknote.
Pj applies the following transformation W
[j] to
|φ[j−1]〉:
W [j] = U
[j]
1 V
[j]
1 ⊗ U [j]2 V [j]2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ U [j]m V [j]m , (11)
where
U
[j]
i = U(a
[j]
i ), V
[j]
i = V (b
[j]
i ). (12)
Pj then obtains |φ[j]〉 by the unitary transformation
W [j] : |φ[j−1]〉 7→ |φ[j]〉, (13)
and sends (LK , |φ[j]〉) to Pj+1 (Pt+1 is the user whom the
banknote is issued to ).
Checking phase. In this phase, t centers collaborate
to check the validity of quantum banknote (LK , |φ′〉).
Here, we assume the t centers are P ′1, . . . , P
′
t . This set of
t centers can be different from the set of centers that col-
laborate to issue the banknote. Each P ′j has calculated
K [j]′ = (a[j]1
′, b[j]1
′, a[j]2
′, b[j]2
′, ..., a[j]m ′, b
[j]
m
′) in the precom-
putation phase. Let |φ[0]′〉 = |φ′〉, and P ′0 be the shop.
(i) For each j = 1, . . . , t, when P ′j receives
(LK , |φ[j−1]′〉) from P ′j−1, he detects the Trojan horse
attack and applies W [j]′ to |φ[j−1]′〉 [here, W [j]′ is de-
fined in the same manner as Eqs. (11)-(12)]. P ′j then
obtains |ϕ[j]′〉 by the unitary transformation
W [j]′ : |φ[j−1]′〉 7→ |ϕ[j]′〉. (14)
Additionally, P ′j chooses a secret
x[j]′ = (x[j]1
′, x[j]2
′, . . . , x[j]m
′), (15)
where x
[j]
i
′ is uniformly choosen from {0, 1}. P ′j then
obtains |φ[j]′〉 by the unitary transformation
V (x
[j]
1
′)⊗ . . .⊗ V (x[j]m ′) : ϕ[j]′〉 7→ |φ[j]′〉. (16)
P ′j sends (LK , |φ[j]′〉) to P ′j+1 (P ′t+1 is the trusted mea-
surer).
(ii) Finally, the trusted measurer requires P ′j(j =
1, . . . ,m) to send the x[j]′ to him secretly, measures |φ[j] ′〉
in the basis (⊕tj=1x[j]1 ′, . . . ,⊕tj=1x[j]m ′), and gets the string
(c1, . . . , cm). (17)
The trusted measurer then checks whether ci = 00 for all
i = 1, . . . ,m. Even if just one result is not 00, the centers
reject the banknote.
Necessity of the trusted measurer: If (LK , |φ′〉)
is an invalid quantum banknote, a dishonest mea-
surer can always deceive the centers by announcing
(c1, . . . , cm)=(00, . . . , 00). So an honest measurer is nec-
essary. It is also necessary that the trusted measurer re-
ceives the value x[j]′ secretly, otherwise the center P ′t can
always send the quantum states |φ[t]′〉 = |00〉⊗ . . .⊗ |00〉
to deceive the trusted measurer.
4auxiliary
qubit
H ✉ ✁
✁✕
T transformation
data
qubit ❤
FIG. 1.Detection scheme of Trojan horse attack.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
The impossibility of Eve’s eavesdropping in the thresh-
old protocol was shown using the quantum key distribu-
tion approach, following the line sketched in [16].
The eavesdropping is restricted to a dishonest partici-
pant in the following.
A dishonest participant, called Bob, is an evil quantum
physicist able to build all devices that are allowed by
the laws of quantum mechanics. Her aim is to find out
another participant’s input and then to reconstruct the
quantum cash with t−2 other participants. Bob prepares
a fake signal and sends it to a participant, called Alice.
Then from the fake signal operated by the Alice, Bob
tries to gain Alice’s input.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice does
one of eight kinds of operations on every two-qubit with
equal probability and that every two-qubit operation is
independent. So it is sufficient to consider Bob’s eaves-
dropping on one two-qubit.
Bob’s fake signal can be presented as |θ〉 = |00〉(a|A〉+
b|B〉+ c|C〉+ d|D〉) + |01〉(e|A〉+ f |B〉+ g|C〉+ h|D〉) +
|10〉(i|A〉 + j|B〉 + k|C〉 + q|D〉) + |11〉(m|A〉 + n|B〉 +
r|C〉+s|D〉), where |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, and |D〉 are normalized
orthogonal states, and |a|2+ |b|2+ |c|2+ |d|2+ |e|2+ |f |2+
|g|2+|h|2+|i|2+|j|2+|k|2+|q|2+|m|2+|n|2+|r|2+|s|2 = 1.
For simplicity, we regard every probability amplitude as
real number, but the security proof is fitted for plural
number. Bob sends the former two-qubit to Alice and
leaves the rest himself.
Alice encodes her input bit by applying one of eight
kinds of operations with equal probability. The state
reads
w =
1
8
|θ〉〈θ| + 1
8
(U ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(U+ ⊗ I)
+
1
8
(U · U ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(U+ · U+ ⊗ I)
+
1
8
(U · U · U ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(U+ · U+ · U+ ⊗ I)
+
1
8
(V ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(V + ⊗ I)
+
1
8
(U · V ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(V + · U+ ⊗ I)
+
1
8
(U · U · V ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(V + · U+ · U+ ⊗ I)
+
1
8
(U · U · U · V ⊗ I)|θ〉〈θ|(V + · U+ · U+ · U+ ⊗ I).
With the matrix form, the mixed state can be represented
as
w =
1
4

a2 + e2 + i2 +m2 ab+ ef + ij +mn ac+ eg + ik +mr ad+ eh+ iq +ms (a+ i)(e +m) af + ej + bm+ in
ab+ ef + ij +mn b2 + f2 + j2 + n2 bc+ fg + jk + nr bd+ fh+ jq + ns be+ fi+ jm+ an (b+ j)(f + n)
ac+ eg + ik +mr bc+ fg + jk + nr c2 + g2 + k2 + r2 cd+ gh+ kq + rs ce+ gi+ km+ ar cf + gj + kn+ br
ad+ eh+ iq +ms bd+ fh+ jq + ns cd+ gh+ kq + rs d2 + h2 + q2 + s2 de+ hi+mq + as df + hj + nq + bs
(a+ i)(e +m) be+ fi+ jm+ an ce+ gi+ km+ ar de + hi+mq + as a2 + e2 + i2 +m2 ab+ ef + ij +mn
af + ej + bm+ in (b+ j)(f + n) cf + gj + kn+ br df + hj + nq + bs ab+ ef + ij +mn b2 + f2 + j2 + n2
ag + ek + cm+ ir bg + fk + cn+ jr (c+ k)(g + r) dg + hk + qr + cs ac+ eg + ik +mr bc+ fg + jk + nr
ah+ dm+ eq + is bh+ dn+ fq + js ch+ gq + dr + ks (d+ q)(h+ s) ad+ eh+ iq +ms bd+ fh+ jq + ns
2(ai+ em) bi+ aj + fm+ en ci+ ak + gm+ er di + hm+ aq + es (a+ i)(e +m) be+ fi+ jm+ an
bi+ aj + fm+ en 2(bj + fn) cj + bk + gn+ fr dj + hn+ bq + fs af + ej + bm+ in (b+ j)(f + n)
ci+ ak + gm+ er cj + bk + gn+ fr 2(ck + gr) dk + cq + hr + gs ag + ek + cm+ ir bg + fk + cn+ jr
di+ hm+ aq + es dj + hn+ bq + fs dk + cq + hr + gs 2(dq + hs) ah+ dm+ eq + is bh+ dn+ fq + js
(a+ i)(e +m) af + ej + bm+ in ag + ek + cm+ ir ah+ dm+ eq + is 2(ai+ em) bi+ aj + fm+ en
be+ fi+ jm+ an (b+ j)(f + n) bg + fk + cn+ jr bh+ dn+ fq + js bi+ aj + fm+ en 2(bj + fn)
ce + gi+ km+ ar cf + gj + kn+ br (c+ k)(g + r) ch+ gq + dr + ks ci+ ak + gm+ er cj + bk + gn+ fr
de+ hi+mq + as df + hj + nq + bs dg + hk + qr + cs (d+ q)(h+ s) di+ hm+ aq + es dj + hn+ bq + fs
5ag + ek + cm+ ir ah+ dm+ eq + is 2(ai+ em) bi+ aj + fm+ en ci+ ak + gm+ er di + hm+ aq + es
bg + fk + cn+ jr bh+ dn+ fq + js bi+ aj + fm+ en 2(bj + fn) cj + bk + gn+ fr dj + hn+ bq + fs
(c+ k)(g + r) ch+ gq + dr + ks ci+ ak + gm+ er cj + bk + gn+ fr 2(ck + gr) dk + cq + hr + gs
dg + hk + qr + cs (d+ q)(h+ s) di+ hm+ aq + es dj + hn+ bq + fs dk + cq + hr + gs 2(dq + hs)
ac+ eg + ik +mr ad+ eh+ iq +ms (a+ i)(e +m) af + ej + bm+ in ag + ek + cm+ ir ah+ dm+ eq + is
bc+ fg + jk + nr bd+ fh+ jq + ns be+ fi+ jm+ an (b+ j)(f + n) bg + fk + cn+ jr bh+ dn+ fq + js
c2 + g2 + k2 + r2 cd+ gh+ kq + rs ce + gi+ km+ ar cf + gj + kn+ br (c+ k)(g + r) ch+ gq + dr + ks
cd+ gh+ kq + rs d2 + h2 + q2 + s2 de+ hi+mq + as df + hj + nq + bs dg + hk + qr + cs (d+ q)(h+ s)
ce+ gi+ km+ ar de + hi+mq + as a2 + e2 + i2 +m2 ab+ ef + ij +mn ac+ eg + ik +mr ad+ eh+ iq +ms
cf + gj + kn+ br df + hj + nq + bs ab+ ef + ij +mn b2 + f2 + j2 + n2 bc+ fg + jk + nr bd+ fh+ jq + ns
(c+ k)(g + r) dg + hk + qr + cs ac+ eg + ik +mr bc+ fg + jk + nr c2 + g2 + k2 + r2 cd+ gh+ kq + rs
ch+ gq + dr + ks (d+ q)(h+ s) ad+ eh+ iq +ms bd+ fh+ jq + ns cd+ gh+ kq + rs d2 + h2 + q2 + s2
ci+ ak + gm+ er di + hm+ aq + es (a+ i)(e +m) be+ fi+ jm+ an ce+ gi+ km+ ar de + hi+mq + as
cj + bk + gn+ fr dj + hn+ bq + fs af + ej + bm+ in (b+ j)(f + n) cf + gj + kn+ br df + hj + nq + bs
2(ck + gr) dk + cq + hr + gs ag + ek + cm+ ir bg + fk + cn+ jr (c+ k)(g + r) dg + hk + qr + cs
dk + cq + hr + gs 2(dq + hs) ah+ dm+ eq + is bh+ dn+ fq + js ch+ gq + dr + ks (d+ q)(h+ s)
(a+ i)(e+m) be+ fi+ jm+ an ce + gi+ km+ ar de+ hi+mq + as
af + ej + bm+ in (b + j)(f + n) cf + gj + kn+ br df + hj + nq + bs
ag + ek + cm+ ir bg + fk + cn+ jr (c+ k)(g + r) dg + hk + qr + cs
ah+ dm+ eq + is bh+ dn+ fq + js ch+ gq + dr + ks (d+ q)(h+ s)
2(ai+ em) bi+ aj + fm+ en ci+ ak + gm+ er di+ hm+ aq + es
bi+ aj + fm+ en 2(bj + fn) cj + bk + gn+ fr dj + hn+ bq + fs
ci+ ak + gm+ er cj + bk + gn+ fr 2(ck + gr) dk + cq + hr + gs
di+ hm+ aq + es dj + hn+ bq + fs dk + cq + hr + gs 2(dq + hs)
(a+ i)(e+m) af + ej + bm+ in ag + ek + cm+ ir ah+ dm+ eq + is
be+ fi+ jm+ an (b + j)(f + n) bg + fk + cn+ jr bh+ dn+ fq + js
ce+ gi+ km+ ar cf + gj + kn+ br (c+ k)(g + r) ch+ gq + dr + ks
de+ hi+mq + as df + hj + nq + bs dg + hk + qr + cs (d+ q)(h+ s)
a2 + e2 + i2 +m2 ab+ ef + ij +mn ac+ eg + ik +mr ad+ eh+ iq +ms
ab+ ef + ij +mn b2 + f2 + j2 + n2 bc+ fg + jk + nr bd+ fh+ jq + ns
ac+ eg + ik +mr bc+ fg + jk + nr c2 + g2 + k2 + r2 cd+ gh+ kq + rs
ad+ eh+ iq +ms bd+ fh+ jq + ns cd+ gh+ kq + rs d2 + h2 + q2 + s2


.(18)
The mutual information between Bob and Alice that can
be extracted from this state is given by the von-Neumann
entropy, I (Alice,Bob)≤ S(w) = Tr{wlog2w}. In order to
calculate the von-Neumann entropy, we need the eigen-
values λ of w, which are the roots of the characteristic
polynomial det(w). Equivalently, we compute the roots
of the characteristic polynomial det(XwX+), yielding
the 16 eigenvalues
λ1,2 =
1
4
((a− i)2 + (b− j)2 + (c− k)2 + (e−m)2
+(f − n)2 + (d− q)2 + (g − r)2 + (h− s)2),
λ3 =
1
4
((a− e+ i −m)2 + (b − f + j − n)2
+(c− g + k − r)2 + (d− h+ q − s)2)),
λ4 =
1
4
((a+ e+ i +m)2 + (b + f + j + n)2
+((c+ g + k + r)2 + (d+ h+ q + s)2)),
λ5−16 = 0. (19)
where
6X =


1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1√
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
1
2 0 0 0 − 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 − 12 0 0 0
0 12 0 0 0 − 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 − 12 0 0
0 0 12 0 0 0 − 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 − 12 0
0 0 0 12 0 0 0 − 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 − 12
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
0 12 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0
0 0 12 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0
0 0 0 12 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0 0 0
1
2


. (20)
So we have
I(Alice, Bob) ≤
−λ1log2λ1 − λ2log2λ2 − λ3log2λ3 − λ4log2λ4. (21)
To λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 =
1
4 , I (Alice,Bob) reaches the
maximal value 2 bits. So Bob can eavesdrop 2 bits of 3
bits operation information on one two-qubit
Especially, I (Alice,Bob) reaches the maximal value
when Bob prepares the legal two-qubit, namely a = 1,
or e = 1, or i = 1, or m = 1, or −a = e = i = m = 12 ,
or a = −e = i = m = 12 , or a = e = −i = m = 12 , or
a = e = i = −m = 12 . Bob can not gain more infor-
mation by sending a fake single than by sending a legal
single.
Bob’s eavesdropping introduces error into quantum
state. Bob can not gain Alice’s input from the two-qubit
operated by both Alice and her next participant. Bob
has to measure the two-qubit to extract Alice’s input
before one two-qubit is resent. To eavesdrop 2 bits op-
eration information, Bob gains the maximal mixed state
1
4I4 through sending a legal two-qubit, or gains one max-
imal mixed state equivalent to 14I4 through sending a
fake singal. After extracting 2 bits operation informa-
tion from 14I4, he has to introduce
3
8 error into whether
one reconstruction two-qubit or the collapse two-qubit.
V. TROJAN HORSE ATTACK CAN BE
DETECTED
A Trojan horse attack bases on the idea that we can
precisely know an unknown quantum state by measuring
many copies of the state. Let Bob prepare the multi-
qubit
∑
i1i2...im
ai1i2...im |i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m (m ≥ 2) to re-
place one data qubit |d〉.
In the detection scheme of the Trojan horse arrack
(Fig. 1), Alice prepares an auxiliary qubit |a〉 = |0〉 or
|a〉 = |1〉.
After the operation H |a〉, the system state is
|η01〉 =
1√
2
∑
i1i2...im
ai1i2...im(|0〉+ |1〉)|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
(|a〉 = |0〉)
or |η11〉 =
1√
2
∑
i1i2...im
ai1i2...im(|0〉 − |1〉)|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
(|a〉 = |1〉).
(22)
Here we use superscripts 0 and 1 to denote the states
corresponding to a = 0 and a = 1, respectively. This
notation also applies to the following equations and we
will, for simplicity, suppress the word “or” later.
Instead of the operator Cad, the operators
Ca1, Ca2, . . . , Cam are performed. The system state
is
|η02〉 =
1√
2
∑
i1i2...im
ai1i2...im(|0〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
+|1〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m),
|η12〉 =
1√
2
∑
i1i2...im
ai1i2...im(|0〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
−|1〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m). (23)
Instead of the operator Tad, the operators
Ta1, Ta2, . . . , Tam are performed. The system state
7is
|η03〉 =
1√
2m+1
∑
i1i2...im
|0〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
{
∑
x2...xm
[(−1)τ(i1x2...xm⊕i1i2...im)
+(−1)τ(i1x2...xm⊕i1i2...im)]ai1x2...xm}
+
1√
2m+1
∑
i1i2...im
|1〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
{
∑
x2...xm
[(−1)τ(i1x2...xm1⊕i1i2...im0)
+(−1)τ(i1x2...xm1⊕i1i2...im0)]ai1x2...xm}
|η13〉 =
1√
2m+1
∑
i1i2...im
|0〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
{
∑
x2...xm
[(−1)τ(i1x2...xm⊕i1i2...im)
+(−1)τ(i1x2...xm⊕i1i2...im)+1]ai1x2...xm}
+
1√
2m+1
∑
i1i2...im
|1〉|i1i2 . . . im〉1,2,...m
{
∑
x2...xm
[(−1)τ(i1x2...xm1⊕i1i2...im0)
+(−1)τ(i1x2...xm1⊕i1i2...im0)+1]ai1x2...xm},
where 0 = 1, 1 = 0, and τ(x1x2 . . . xn) represents the
number of xkxk+1 = 11 (k = 1, 2, . . . n− 1), for example,
τ(1100111) = 3, τ(1011011) = 2.
The detection scheme can detect a multi-qubit instead
of a single-qubit with probability 12 . When m ≥ 4, the
probability amplitude of |0〉|i1 . . . im−3im−2im−1im〉 in
|η03〉 and that of |0〉|i1 . . . im−3im−2im−1im〉 in |η13〉 are
same or opposite, so the probability of |a〉 = |0〉 in the
|η03〉 equals to the probability of |a〉 = |0〉 in the |η13〉.
Additionally verifying the cases of m = 2, 3, we can con-
clude that when measuring the auxiliary qubit, if we gain
|1〉 in the |η03〉 with probability α, we must gain |0〉 in the
|η13〉 with probability 1 − α. So the auxiliary qubit flips
with probability 12 .
Since the detection is a linear operation applied to
quantum state, it will work not only with pure states,
but also with mixed states. For example, Bob sends the
legal state |00〉 or many copies of |00〉 to Alice, the mixed
state inputs the detection. With two auxiliary qubits,
Alice can detect the case of many copies of |00〉 with
probability 34 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a threshold quantum
protocol based on two-qubit operation. The number of
qubits of the generated quantum state by the threshold
protocol equals to that of the quantum state generated by
the original (nonthreshold) protocol. Fake signal attack
strategy and Trojan horse attack strategy of the dishon-
est participant are investigated. The proposed protocol
is shown to resist these attacks.
The proposed two-qubit operation based on Grover’s
algorithm can also be included in QSDC protocols and
MQSS protocols. The proposed detection scheme of Tro-
jan horse attack can be included in the other quantum
cryptography protocols.
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